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This month, the Joint Committee on Ausl!n water Uhlitv's 1-toaoqal Piao CJo1nl Comm1ltee) finalized 
recommendations to the AusM Ciiy Council for reforms to the utility's rate structure. The local media 
h;ive reportA<t the Committee recommendations will ultimately lead to higher rates to make up for 
revenue sllOctfalls that have resulted from improved conservation and drought restr1ct1ons. 
The council is expected lo consider the recommendations this summe1 and, in some quarters. there is 
already grumbling that Austin residents are being penalized for doing the eight thing by conserving 
·water. This argument has an element of truth, given the causal connect on between water usage and 
system revenues. 
Bui the alternative policy option would have been for Austin to meet an even greater demand by 
producing additional water supplies, which would have been expensive and required toe utll~y to take 
on debt that could only be repaid through even highe< rates. No matter what the crty did, water would 
have become pnc1er. 
If anything, the Joint Committee's recommendations serve as another reminder of the pol1t1cally 
fraught balancing act of designing utility rate stroctures, pa~ularty in an era or mounting water 
scarcity 
In fact, Austin 1s !ar from alone in having to increase its rates. This month, the engineering firm Black 
& Veatch found m a nahonal survev of 368 water utd11ies that 66 percent were strugghng to bring in 
sufficient revenues to cover costs, with drought as primary culprit in several states. 
In February, the Texas Tnbune ~ U1at the credit agency Fitch had downgraded ralings for 
certain debt from the City of Fort Worth and Tarrant Regional Water District because of dec·iniog 
revenues. And W1ch1ta Falls - which is cuire11tly 111 the fifth and highest stage of its Drought 
Contingency Plan, meaning that residents cannot irrigate golf courses with city water, fi ll pools with 
potable water or wash cars outside of a commercial carwash facility- had to raise its rates. 
Water and Price Signals 
Resource economists often say that the most cost-effective way to promote more economically 
efficient water usage is to end water subsidies. It pnces were not distorted, the thinking goes, and in 
particular if they renected the scarcity of water (the way that they do for global commod1t1es like 
copper or natural gas), water would not be overused, as is ii currently is, and ii would flow toward its 
highest-value uses. 
In the commercial life cycle of a unit of wate1, there a1e mullip!e points at which 1t is priced and 
transferred. And in the United States, at each of those points, it is generally underpriced. 
I would start at the moment of allocation. With a couple caveats, American law gives states ownership 
over their water resources States then determine how to allocate these resources. They do so at 
both a macro scale, when devising allocation regimes. and at a micro scale. when allocating 
individual rights. Texas, for instance, decided long ago that it would apply the rule or capture to 
groundwater. The state could have cla med ownership over the groundwater and auctioned it off the 
way some countnes sell on oil concess1oos Instead the state basically gave groundwater resources 
away for free to property owners. 
On the micro scale, the state has followed mo1e 01 less the same approach giving away mdMdual 
surface water rights without attempting to collect any revenues as consideration. That is the financial 
equivalent ol 1mpos1ng a cap-and-trade regime and hand'ng out permits for free, for pemi1ttees to 
collect all the upside. 
After the initial allocauoo water could be transferred several times more, either through the lease or 
sale some portion of a water right or through the sale of utility services. In Central Texas, for 
instance, a nver au thonty might acquire a water nght from the state, then sell a portion of its water to 
a wholesaler, which would then sell to a relaller which would 1n turn sell water services to a utility end 
customer. As that chain of transactions progresses, the price of water may become increasingly 
antangled with U1e pnce of waler-related services, which could include the storing, conveying, and 
treating or water. 
These services, however, may themselves be s1gml1can1ty subsidized, further compounding the 
underpricing of water. The American landscape is speckled with infrastructure projects that tax.payees 
- rather lhan for instance ratepayers - paid for. 
The new State Water Implementation Fund for Texas (SWIFT) is part of a scheme that is not as 
lavish as the twentieth century Bureau ot Reclamation budding boom but 11 represents a dishnct 
transfer of weatth from taxpayers to ratepayers. SWIFT was set up to provide state.level financial 
ass1slance for water infrastructure projects. It was capitalized with a $2 billion appropriation from the 
state's Rainy Day Fund, which has been !.!l!fill because of 011 and gas tax revenues. to the end, 
energy companies will end up subsidizing the cost of building water infrastructure - and by 
extension, the costs that utility customers pay for water servi<:es. 
That the tax law serves to transfer wea'th from one stakeholder community to another is not a novel 
obse1vation But 1t does serve to demonstrate the extent to which water - from its moment of 
allocation, on down to its moment or consumpbon out of a kitchen taucet - 1s priced 1n a way that 
buries price signals and encourages excessive usage. 
Utlllty Rate Structures 
For decades. uhlmes have recognized that they can manipulate rate structures to deliver pnce signals 
U-.at promote desired patterns of serv1te usage Atthough water ut1htres have not experimented with 
the!f rates to the degree that energy utilities have, many have moved toward structures that promote 
conservation. 
Naturally, some ut1ht1es have adopted more aggressively conservation-oriented structures than others 
have. Those that have pursued conservation have general ly done so because they face resource 
pressures, system capa<:ity pressures, or political pressures. 
Ratemaking is a complicated undertaking even under ordinary circumstances, and cooservalion goals 
make it that much more complicated. Utilities have a built-in throughout incentive: because their 
revenues increase with sates, Uley fare baller financially when they sell more services But selling 
more servkes 1s the opposite of conservation, which sets up the utility to perform worse unless 1  finds 
some wfr-/ to compensate. 
What's more. util ities' costs tend to relatively fixed. Their biggest budget items are tied to 
mlcastructuce and basic system operations But conservation pricing is volumetric; it charges 
customers according to the amount of services lhey pu1chase. causing 1evenues to swmg wrth 
changes in customer consumption patterns, even as the utilities' payment obligations hold steady 
This mismatch can create instability, wh ich uncontrollable external cond1t1oos may further amplify. In 
wet periods, fo1 example, ut1t1ty customers need less water lor landscape irrigation, and revenues 
decrease. In droughls customers need (or al last purchase) less waler because of usage 
restrictions; aftelWard, even alter both droughts and restrictions have lifted, customers frequently 
maintain certain water-reducing practices (i.e , they do not rip out their xeriscapmg); and in both the 
short and long run revenues decrease. Under either scenario, uhlities lose 
Austin Water as a Model 
In February 2014, the Sierra Club, Lone Star Chapter, and UNC E11viroomen1a1 Finance Center 
published a guide to rate-setting 1n Texas, Desigrnng Water Rate Structures foe Conservahon and 
llAVAnuA Stahil!\v The report hailed Austm 's rate structure and credited the Joint Committee, which 
was originally brought together 1n 2012, for the dehberauve process 1  followed and for the policies it 
recommended. 
In its earlier incarnation the Joint Committee recommended that Austin Water increase the 
percentage of total revenues rt derived from fixed charges. from 11 percent al that time to a goal of 20 
percent. The Joint Commiuee said thal lhe utility could accomplish this by mshtuting a revenue 
stability lee and establishing a revenue stab1tiiy reserve fund. 
As a partial metric of the success of the current structure (along with other conservation pol1c1es), 
Austin has reduced !he number of gallons 1t uses per capita per day below 140 - a benchmark that it 
had orig111a!ly commdled to reaching by 2020 
2014 Joint Committee 
In a March 2014 0Wlli! to city council, City Manage1 Ma1c Ott said that the utility business model is 
·unsustainable." He explained "The Utility has many base costs that aren't dramatically impacted by 
how much water it treats and delivers to customers I towever, with the current structure emphasizing 
volumetric rates, these costs are not being furlde<l adequately. Although decreasing use does lower 
some of the Utility's costs. the decrease is not equal to tho drop in revenue seen via the current rare 
structure: 
OU went on to say that that •the Utility is promoting long term conservation but wtth the current rate 
structure dropping, consumption will not fund base expenses IE]ven ongoing budget scrubbing 
won't be enough to right the ship. So irs bme to devise a new and enduring business model and rate 
structure that reflects the permanent advance of conservation while still fundmg the utility at a level 
that will keep high quahty water services lo all our customers · 
To that end, Ott reconvened the Jomt Commrttee. which the city council had originally assembled in 
2012 and charged with exploring various policies (such as a graduated revenue stability fee, a 
revenue slability fund, and service extension request reimbursement policies) that could provide 
greater revenue stability while still promoting consRrvat1on goals 
The committee, which draws~ from the city's Water and Waste Water Commission, 
Resource Management Commission, and Impact Fee Advisory Commission, presented the council 
with a series of recommendations, many of which the council implemented. Still, revenue has 
remained a challenge 
Joint Committee Recommendations 
Ott directed the reassembled committee lo delNer !Is talest round of recommendations m time for the 
council to consider them during us next budget process. The committee held seven public meebngs 
between March and May, and developed the frve recommendations that were final ized this month. 
(Schedules of the rate structures that lhe committee has recnmmenctad mod1tymg can be found here.) 
1. Revenue Projections: When forecasbng revenues, Austin Water should assume that Stage 2 
water restrictions will continue throughout liscal year 2015. lo addition, the Joint Committee 
found that Austin Water had underestimated the magnttude of drought-driven customer 
cutbacks and shOuld follow "a more conservative approach to water revenue projections: 
2. 2015 Proposed Rate Design: Austin Water should: (a) mamtain the same overall equivalent 
m1mmum charges; (b) maintain an approximate $10 50 del1ii be1ween blocks 1 and 5 of the 
tiered minimum charges (so that, if rates increase, they will do so in unison) (c) vary the fixed 
charge for commercial and multilamay customers according to meter s12e; (d) aim to achieve 20 
percent of revenues lrom fixed charges; (e) maintain the current volumetric break points; and (f) 
maintain an S1 1 00 delta between the highest and lowest blocks for volumetric charges 
3. Future Proposed Rate Design (FY 2016 and Beyond): Austin Water should: (a) increase from 
20 to 25 percent the portion of revenues earned from fixed charges; (b) increase the delta 
between the blocks 1 and 5 tiered m1mmum char9es from $10.50 to $22 75; and (c) set the 
volumetric charges for blocks 2 through 5 at least as high as the average volumetric cost of 
service rate 
4. Drought Rates Austin Water should impose a drnught 1a1e whenever the city implements~ 
3 or Staoe 4 water restrictions. The Jomt Committee did not recommend specific amounts for 
the drought rates. 
5. Ut1!1ty Expenses: Austin Water should reduce its budget and, with the exception of the 8.2 
percent 11 transfers to the General Fund, end its practice of t ransferring extra revenues to other 
city funds unre'ated to murnc1pal ac!Jv111es. The ubllty cuccently or has Ill the past transferred 
revenues to the Sustainabihly Fund, the Economic Development Fund, and the Economic 
lncenhves Reserve Fund, according to the Joint Committee. 
It is worth noting that. in 2012, lhe Joint Committee recommended spec1hc rates This time around, 
the committee did not It put forward specific Austin Water budget reductions but, aside from the 
proposed deltas between high and low block charges, only general goals for rates. 
Unideal Alternatives 
Neither the revenue instability that the Joint Committee was summoned to address nor the likelihood 
of higher customer roles should be taken as evidence 1.1ga111sl lhe current rate structure, or against 
conservation pricing more broadly. 
Designing rates is inherently dilficult and requires utilities to balance policy concerns that are directly 
al odds Conservahon, revenue stability, affordability, and economic development all tug rates In 
different directions. But Austin Water had !JtUe choice 1n 1ncrea~mg i ts emphasis on conservation. 
If Austin had not reduced its water usage, 1t would have reached the hm1ts of its supply The drought 
expedited this process by cutting mto available supplies. But even without the drought, population 
growth and proportionate increases m water demand would have eventually pushed the water system 
to the brink. Austin Water would have had to respond by developing additional supplies, which could 
have involved some combination of new water nghts end •nfrastructuce protects. 
Conservation is widely regarded as the~ source of water. On a per-u!l!t basis new 
mtrastructure would cost more though the costs could be apportioned differently. For conservation. 
for instance, mandatory water cestnctioos act as a kind of cost tha t may be paid through 
inconvenience suffered and through effects on property (i.e., a property owner installs thirsty grass 
that she cannot water sufficiently while abiding by restnctioos on landscape irrigation). And for new 
i11fr1.1sllucture, ce1ain costs may be borne by taxpayers. 
Over the last three decades, however, federal subsidies for water infrastructure have steadily 
decreased. (One data point: th s month President Obama ~ the Waler Resources Reform and 
Development Act of 2014, approving $12.3 billion for water infrastructure projects. The last federal 
water bill was passed m 2007 and was for S23 b!H1on.) 
Without subsidies, infrastructure proJ8cls become finant1ally nsk1er proposl!Joos A 2012 Cirulf1 from 
the oonprofn Ceres found that to repay iofcas1ructuce debt utilities musl generally increase rates, 
which can depress demand, requiring more rate increases to cover debt costs, which could depress 
demand further 
While not alt inflastructure succumbs to this kmd ot death spiral, rt 1s a risk and higher rates come 
with tho territory. Considered in lhis context, Austin Water's business model may face challenges, 
and its customers may lace higher rates, the utility has acted prudently 1n designmg its rate structure. 
Whetl1e1 II pursued conservation or not higher costs were on the horizon. 
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